Averaging plus Learning in financial markets by Popescu, Ionel & Vaidya, Tushar
AVERAGING + LEARNING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
IONEL POPESCU AND TUSHAR VAIDYA
ABSTRACT. This paper develops original models to study interacting agents in financial markets.
The key feature of these models is how interactions are formulated and analysed. Agents learn from
their observations and learning ability to interpret news or private information. Central limit theo-
rems are developed but they arise rather unexpectedly. Under certain type of conditions governing
the learning, agents’ beliefs converge in distribution that can be even fractal. The underlying ran-
domness in the systems is not restricted to be of a certain class. Fresh insights are gained not only
from developing new non-linear social learning models but also from using different techniques to
study discrete time random linear dynamical systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
How do markets reach consensus on prices? This is the central theme of this paper. Traders
interact with one another and learn from their environment. Our aim is to propose new models of
interaction and learning.
These new models of learning and interaction entail agents who observe actions of other traders
and update their own beliefs. Repeated interaction can in certain cases lead to consensus on a par-
ticular value of a tradeable commodity. Interaction models should take into account the environ-
ment of trading. The more traditional or tried approach is to analyze limit order books. However,
the introduction of electronic limit order books poses challenges but also offers new opportunities
to develop new models.
Learning models offer a cogent and natural way to analyse interaction when agents learn and
observe each others’ past actions. For such models there is a rich interplay between probability,
dynamical systems and game theoretic ideas [MT+17]. Our goal here is to introduce novel ways to
analyse learning in the financial markets. Researchers have developed many mathematical pric-
ing models that use tools from stochastic calculus and partial differential equations (PDEs). The
issue of price formation at a microscopic level is not really addressed nor is interaction a feature
in traditional stochastic asset pricing models. The standard object is in formulating a stochastic
process that represents a stock price. For example, the most basic would be geometric Brownian
motion:
dSt = µSt dt+ σSt dWt.
Here µ and σ denote the mean rate of return and volatility for some stock and Wt is a Brownian
motion. These basic processes then form the backbone of advanced option pricing models that
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FIGURE 1. Trust chain of agents on opinions. All individuals have self belief, which
is identified by loops.
postulate a process for the asset. Let us turn the question on its head. What if we don’t know the
process? Traditional finance models assure us that St is a good process to model the stock price
and St is the market consensus price or the mid price of indicative quotes. But if we dig a little
bit deeper we have to ask how did the marketplace decide on the stock price St in the first place.
There must have been interactions between the players to arrive at this quote.
One may propose more advanced stochastic processes but we are interested in a more basic
question. How do we study interaction at the microscopic level? At a higher frequency level,
agents or machines (algorithms) are interacting before a consensus is reached.
An alternative way to ask is how do agents actually trading come to reach a consensus on a
particular price? In many instance, models will postulate that a financial asset’s current price be
the available. What mechanism led to that price being selected. It seems natural to develop aspects
of social learning as a starting point.
2. FOUNDATIONS
Social learning models are now actively studied in many disciplines and there are many dis-
tinct frameworks. The literature is too vast for us to cite all the major works. So we will highlight
the most relevant ones. In all walks of life, individuals make decisions by observing and infer-
ring actions of others. What thought process leads one to make a choice after seeing his or her
peers select theirs is a central question not only in the social sciences but also in engineering and
physics [Lor05]. The key point is observation. Human beings are visual creatures. One of the most
canonical models in learning and aggregation of information is the Degroot model [DeG74].
Example 1. Imagine we have 3 agents who each have an initial opinion X0. They also take a weighted
average of their neighbours: figure 1. Individuals act simultaneously.
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Round by round the agents observe the previous quotes and update their beliefs by taking new average
updates of the truth. The averaging matrix is
A =
1/3 1/3 1/31/2 1/2 0
0 1/4 3/4

and the dynamics are Xt = AXt−1. Iterating this, we obtain Xt = AtX0. Provided that the matrix A is
aperiodic and irreducible consensus is reached and all the agents reach the same decision limt→∞X = C1
for some C ∈ R. Of course, the consensus value depends on the initial value. Instructive and illustrative
examples are developed in [Jac10].
This simple example Degroot belies many important subtleties. Some social learning purists
might object that there are redundancies. Agent 1 may take a weighted average of all agents but
then agent 2 is also incorporating views of the other agents also which gets double counted by
agent 1 in further iterations. This is a strength of the model.
The whole updating process is such that provided the matrix A is irreducible and aperiodic
there is eventual consensus. The fact there is double counting is not viewing the problem correctly.
As each player may weigh beliefs differently. Players’ different averaging weights are seen as their
own unique take on the averaging rule. By repeated averaging, agents agree on how to average
the same way: the rows become equal.
We focus on Degroot learning models as these represent the reality of trading accurately. This
style of learning is preferable because agents act simultaneously in a round-by-round fashion.
In contrast, for sequential learning models, each agent makes a decision or update based on the
information set of previous choices. Aggregation of information occurs as more agents update
but at each point in time only one agent updates. Private signals can also be incorporated in
this setting. However, the sequential nature of updating seems unnatural. For a good survey
of social learning in both sequential and simultaneous settings one may refer to [GS, MT+17,
AO11]. Average-based dynamics leads to efficient outcomes provided no individual exerts a large
influence [GJ10]. Averaging agents are also known as Naive learners because they use the same
rule repeatedly. More generally, these type of dynamics fall under the growing literature on non-
Bayesian social learning .
2.1. Bayesian Observational Learning. Theoretical social learning models are roughly divided
into two paradigms: Bayesian and non-Bayesian. Bayesian observational learning examples in-
clude [Ban92, BHW92] and [SS00]. They fall under the category of herd behaviour. These models
are sequential in nature. Agents have a common prior P(θ) for some state of the world θ ∈ Θ at
t = 0, where Θ is the set of possible states. As time passes, a player in turn observes the actions of
previous agents and receives a private signal. Each agent has a one-off decision when she updates
her posterior probability and takes an action (usually a binary choice). In some instances a correct
decision is reached on the true state of the world by the nth agent as n → ∞. After some point,
everyone may take the same action. So do agents asymptotically learn the truth?
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Even in the simplest of settings, characterizing equilibria is intractable [CEMS08] and compu-
tationally difficult [HJMR18]. Agents are assumed to be perfect Bayesian machines, who can do
complex posterior calculations by observing past actions and possess a common prior. These as-
sumptions may seem a bit unrealistic or too strong. There could be signals that leads society astray.
Information flows in one direction, where an infinite number of agents are exogenously ordered
on a line. If the first few signals are wrong, there could be a cascade and no asymptotic learning
takes place. Nevertheless, Bayesian models serve as a useful benchmark. Asymptotic Bayesian
social learning is examined at length in [MST14], where the one-off action is relaxed to allow for
repeated plays.
Many modelling environments assume there is a ground truth that agents want to learn. It
could be that there is no ground truth. Recently there has been some work to try an axiomatic
semi-Bayesian approach [MTSJ18]. A more general framework for rational learning is offered in
[MF13] from a theoretical economics standpoint.
2.2. Financial markets: non-Bayesian. In financial markets, trading is never sequential. Trans-
actions occurs at breakneck speed. Agents move simultaneously: cancellations are the norm in
today’s fast markets. In practical terms, sequential learning models don’t seem appropriate. In-
teraction is important in the emergence of consensus. Choices by agents from the previous round
of play are available to all agents in the current round of play. The question is then what sort of
averaging or heuristic process is ideal.
Degroot learning models convey an essential idea. They offer a functional form of updating.
Myopic updating occurs in each round. Something akin to persuasion bias could explain our
basic model [DVZ03]. As in an echo chamber, agents in our setup have fixed weights but update
their responses until consensus is reached. One could think of it as a behavioural heuristic and
why repeated averaging is effective. Alternatively, with the right cost function representing the
distance of an agent’s opinion against other opinions the best response is repeated averaging.
Recently there have been some experimental papers on evidence of Degroot updating [CLX15,
BBC17]. Repeated averaging models are our base precisely because they capture the nature of
interaction and learning in financial markets so succinctly. On top of the base models we develop
more sophisticated extensions, relaxing the fixed nature of the weights and learning matrices.
2.3. Multiagent learning. Degroot updating is also studied as distributed consensus in the engi-
neering community [Bau16]. A group of sensors or drones communicate to reach consensus. Here
existing methods use graph theory. Moreover, the techniques we introduce to solve the consensus
problems are quite distinct from the usual ones utilized in engineering literature. Distributed con-
sensus has an updating rule in the simplest of cases as xt = A(t)xt−1, with xt ∈ Rn and A a row
stochastic matrix. Agents can be seen as vertices in a graph (G) with edges that is represented as
G(V, E). Usually, the graphs have a fixed set of vertices so V = {1, 2, · · · , n} and the edges (j, k)
denote if agent j puts weight on k’s opinion. In our setting, this corresponds to the number of
agents being fixed while the edges or links can be random or time varying. One can interpret the
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framework we investigate as a distributed consensus problem. Generally, in engineering prob-
lems, the emphasis is on design of algorithms that can control the decentralized process to reach
consensus. Distribution algorithms on agreement have been extensively studied in engineering.
Some related works are [MS07, BHOT05, OSFM07, Mor05].
2.4. Game theory. Our emphasis is on trading but any network where the players have access
to some sort of learning feedback is suitable. A game theoretic framework where every player
takes into account other players’ payoff is unrealistic and points to serious difficulties on how to
even represent utilities; these are economic arguments that are better addressed by philosophical
interludes. Moreover, traders rarely have access to private information on how previous decisions
led to a certain payoff for their opponent at least not in a high frequency sense. If a trading firm
is a publicly listed company, then one can infer its trading losses or gains from public records.
Nevertheless specific profit and loss accounts of trading individual stocks is a private matter.
Firms never break down their income statements down to specific asset classes or instruments.
Results are amalgamated and reported quarterly: not per hour, minute or second.
Therefore, pure game theory has its shortcomings. Similar questions and issues to this paper
were raised in [Kir02] at an informal level. Our interest is in building a suitable mathematical
structure on which to ask those interesting questions of price formation. Players can observe pre-
vious choices but not the payoffs of their competitors. A more in depth discussion of learning in
games would take us further away from our goal of studying the mathematical nature of interac-
tion. The reader can consult [FDLL98, KL94] for a game theoretic perspective. Dynamical learning
is an active area of research in computer science as well. Articles [PP18, PNGCS14, MPV17] pro-
pose and analyze the dynamics separate from the concept of Nash equilibrium.
3. BASIC MODELS
Economists also have many models of learning [Sob00]. Depending on the question, different
paradigms have been put forth. Our objective is learning and so we aim to use aspects of both
game theory and dynamical systems. Difficulties in Bayesian environments mean the Degroot
model has become a workhorse for social learning [BBCM19]. It offers a way forward for tractable
models that can relax simple assumptions. Research using this framework is still active. In our
setting, a group of traders observe quotes of others and incorporate an average of previous round
quotes. The departure from standard Degroot learning comes from the fact that not only are the
agents learning but they are getting feedback from an external source on the true consensus value.
To our knowledge, the setting of these types of consensus models to trading is new. We use the
framework of [VMP18] as the base case for our models. Consider
(3.1) xit+1 =
n∑
j=1
aijx
j
t + i(σ¯ − xit),
which in the matrix form reads
(3.2) Xt+1 = AXt + E(σ¯1n −Xt),
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where Xt = (x1t , ..., xnt )T is the opinion of each agent in discrete time t, and E = diag(1, ..., n) is
the learning rate of each agent when they are provided with a feedback on the consensus σ¯. The
opinion matrix A encapsulates the weights agents put on each other. We require
∑n
j=1 aij = 1.
Agents’ aptitude to determine the quality of feedback is their ability .
For our purposes, we are careful to distinguish between two concepts: learning and trading
time. We will focus on learning time. Typically in active financial markets, the quotes (bids and
offers) that agents post are cancelled or revised many times before actual trades occur. Although
trading is occurring at a high frequency, the revision of quotes is occurring at an even higher
frequency. See [GPW+13] for a discussion on cancellations. Agents or market participants are all
trying to learn the true value of a traded instrument. Agents can see all the previous quotes and
thus take a weighted view of what the next quote should be. The learning activity occurs before
σ¯ is actually evolving due to trading. For us, time t is learning time and is quite distinct from
trading time, which we we will assume to be constant. We weaken the condition of convergence
as stated in [VMP18].
The feedback can best explain the situation where a similar instrument is traded on another
exchange or there is a common source of market chatter. Moreover, such chatter is commonly
provided through voice box brokers or over-the-counter markets. We assume all agents have
access to this feedback or chatter. One example would the S&P500 European ETF (SPY) options,
which are not cash settled as SPX options but stock settled. Quotes for the SPY options will also
be linked with the SPX options. Another example of contracts that contain information on vols is
a VIX (volatility index) futures contract. Sometimes trades occur off-exchange and get reported at
the end of the day through the exchange’s clearing system. How agents interpret information or
market chatter is their unique learning ability.
4. ORGANIZATION OF RESULTS
We investigate variations of the model 3.1, characterizing different features. In section 6, the
result from [VMP18] is relaxed to see under what conditions consensus is still possible. A key
feature is that provided agents have positive learning rates i, then consensus is the equilibrium
value. In this case, while the particular value is unknown at the start, learning and interaction
ensure convergence to equilibrium.
While the first type of deterministic dynamics are useful, they ignore the reality of noise. Ran-
domness is an additional term in the feedback term in section 7. We introduce a random variable
γt as a source of noise. The main theorem shows that if γt → 0 almost surely or in probability, then
Xt → σ¯. However, the argument is not straightforward.
Theorem 6 explains the mechanics behind these concepts. Furthermore, provided the weights
matrix A and learning rates E satisfy some weak conditions, Xt reaches consensus. If the noise is
not going to zero, then the system converges in distribution. Numerical simulations confirm that
Xt does reach an asymptotic distribution that may not even be Gaussian.
Nonlinear learning 8 is an extension of our Degroot learners. Players still average from their
observations of past actions but their own unique learning ability and how they interpret the
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extra information is a nonlinear function. This type of model fits with the earlier linear models,
preserving the averaging nature of interaction. Suitable conditions on the nonlinear function are
derived that exhibit consensus. If the shocks are permanent, then convergence to distribution is
possible as with the linear case.
Section 9 presents an important weak convergence (in law) result. The true state is arrived at en-
dogenously and the consensus value is an endogenous feature. While the earlier sections assumed
that the equilibrium value or σ¯ is present in the system, this section assumes no such universal
truth. Though the agents in earlier dynamics come to learn σ¯ they do not know it outright. In the
averaging case, we propose that σ¯ is not part of the system. Whatever value agents asymptotically
converge to, provided they all agree, is the consensus value. This presents challenges to prove
convergence to a probability measure. The main result in this section is the central limit theorem
(9.13). Lindberg’s original argument is helpful in proving the CLT.
In all our models, if the agents are already synchronized or at consensus, then the system stays
there. While this may seem a moot point, it is worth mentioning. In traditional game-theoretic
models the focus is on equilibrium. The focus here is how do agents reach the steady state.
5. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
In all subsequent analysis A refers to a row-stochastic weights matrix, whose rows sum to one.
Depending on the setup, A can be time varying or fixed.
We use the infinity norm, namely we take for a vector v =

v1
...
vn
 ,
|v|∞ = max
i=1,··· ,n
|vi|.
For any m× n matrix B, we denote
|B|∞ = sup
i=1,...,m
n∑
j=1
|bij |.
We then have for any m× n matrix B and any n dimensional vector v
|Bv|∞ ≤ |B|∞|v|∞.
6. BASE MODEL
In the base model, we have n agents and a fixed row-stochastic matrix A, which is the weights
matrix. The dynamics for updating is
(6.1) Xt+1 = AXt + E(σ¯1n −Xt).
We can impose a weaker condition on i and use σ¯ = σ¯1n for notational convenience when the
dimension is clear.
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Proposition 2. If 0 < i < 2aii, then all agents reach the same consensus value
lim
t→∞Xt = σ¯.
Proof. Equation 6.1 now becomes
Xt+1 − σ¯ = (A− E)(Xt − σ¯).
Setting B = (A− E) and Yt = Xt+1 − σ¯, the updating rule simplifies to
(Yt)i =
n∑
j=1
bij(Yt−1)j ,
from which can then obtain
|(Yt)i| ≤
n∑
j=1
|bij ||(Yt−1)j |
≤ |Yt−1|∞
n∑
j=1
|bij |.
Therefore, |Yt|∞ ≤ |Yt−1|∞maxi=1,··· ,n
∑n
j=1 |bij |.
On the other hand bij = aij , if i 6= j so that
n∑
j=1
|bij | = |aii − i|+
n∑
j 6=i
|aij | = |aii − i|+ 1− aii,
where we have used the stochasticity of A, that is sum of the elements of each row is 1. From
this if we check that |aii − i| + 1 − aii < 1 which is the same as |aii − i| < aii or equivalently
0 < i < 2aii, then with
ρ = max
i
(|aii − i|+ 1− aii).
we definitely obtain 0 ≤ ρ < 1 and |Yt|∞ ≤ ρ |Yt−1|∞. This is enough to conclude that
|Yt|∞ ≤ ρt |Y0|∞.
From which letting t→∞ shows that
|Yt|∞ −−−→
t→∞ 0
and in particular also proves that Yt −→
t→∞ 0. 
Remarks. This argument allows an extension to the case when the matrices At and Et depend on t. The
bottom line here is that we want
ρt = max
i
(|aii(t)− i(t)|+ 1− aii(t))
so that
(6.2)
t∏
i=1
ρi −→
t→∞ 0.
For example, this is the case if all ρt are bounded by ρ < 1. However, condition 6.2 also allows
cases where ρt −→
t→∞ 1. We highlight two examples. For the first we have convergence.
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Example 3. Let’s consider ρt = tt+1 , then
∏t
i=1 ρi =
1
t+1 which converges to 0 as t→∞.
However, condition 6.2 also ensures we don’t have the following situation.
Example 4. Let’s consider ρt = exp(− 1t2 ), then
∏t
i=1 ρi = exp(−
∑t
k=1
1
k2
) which does not converge to
zero.
Condition 6.2 can also be written as
t∑
i=1
log ρi −−−→
t→∞ −∞,
or differently as
t∑
i=1
(− log ρi) −−−→
t→∞ ∞.
In fact, this is the case if − log ρt
t−α ≥ C for some C > 0 and α > 0. This translates to
ρt ≤ e−Ctα .
We can extend the conclusions if we replace the∞-norm of a vector by something of the form
|ν|∞,β = max
i=1,··· ,n
|νi|/βi
where β is a vector of positive values such that Aβ ≤ δβ. In this new norm we now have
|(Yt)i| ≤
n∑
j=1
|bij ||(Yt−1)j |
|(Yt)i|
βi
≤
n∑
j=1
|bij |βj
βi
|(Yt−1)|j
βj
,
which yields
|(Yt)|∞,β ≤ |(Yt−1)|∞,β max
i=1,··· ,n
n∑
j=1
|bij |βj
βi
= |(Yt−1)|∞,β max
i=1,··· ,n
|aii − i|+ 1
βi
n∑
j 6=i
aijβj
 .
From the assumptionAβ ≤ δβ we can get in the first place that∑nj=1 aijβj ≤ δβi or∑nj 6=i aijβj ≤
βi(δ − aii) and thus 1βi
∑n
j 6=i aijβj ≤ (δ − aii). This yields
|Yt|∞,β ≤ |(Yt−1)|∞,β max
i=1,··· ,n
(|aii − i|+ δ − aii) .
as long as |aii− i|+ δ−aii < 1, which is satisfied by−(1− δ) < i < 1− δ+ 2aii. The question is if
there exists such a vector with Aβ ≤ δβ (this means component wise). Such a choice is β =

1
...
1

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and δ = 1 since A is a stochastic matrix. If such a β exists with δ < 1 then we get a relaxation of
the main condition.
Interestingly, if A is not necessarily stochastic but has positive entries, then by a theorem of
Perron-Frobenius there exists a real eigenvalue that is greater than the absolute value of all the
other eigenvalues and its eigenvector has positive entries. The argument above shows that we can
definitely choose δ and β to have the same result.
The above arguments allow us to posit this result.
Theorem 5. Assume Xt = AtXt−1 +Et(σ¯−Xt−1) and let ρt = maxi=1,··· ,n(|(at)ii− (t)i|+ 1− (at)ii).
If
∏t
s=1 ρs −→t→∞ 0, then Xt −→t→∞ σ¯.
In the case At are all equal to A, then if 0 < i < 2aii, i = 1, · · · , n, then Xt −→
t→∞ σ¯.
7. LEARNING WITH RANDOM NOISE
Our base model with learning can be extended to have random noise in the feedback term. We
introduce a random vector γt which we quantify later. The hypothesis is that γt is small. For this
section we also consider the case of time depending evolution.
The model is given by
Xt = AtXt−1 + Et(σ¯ + γt −Xt−1)
where Xt is the vector of prices at time t and σ¯ is the vector of equilibrium price or consensus
value the agents are trying to learn. In order to prove that Xt − σ¯ converges to 0, we rewrite the
equation as
Xt − σ¯ = AtXt−1 − σ¯ + Et(σ¯ −Xt−1) + Etγt
= AXt−1 −Atσ¯ + Et(σ¯ −Xt−1) + Etγt as Aσ¯ = σ¯
= (At − Et)(Xt−1 − σ¯) + Etγt.
Therefore if we denote by Yt = Xt−1 − σ¯, then we ca simplify the above expression as
Yt = (At − Et)Yt−1 + Etγt.
With the same argument as before we obtain
|Yt|∞ ≤ ρt|Yt−1|∞ + C|γt|
with
(7.1) ρt = max
i=1,··· ,n
(|(at)ii − (t)i|+ 1− (at)ii).
We formulate a general result as follows.
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Theorem 6. Assume the model Xt = AtXt−1 + Et(σ¯ + γt −Xt−1). With the notation from (7.1) assume
that
(7.2) sup
t≥1
{ρt + ρtρt−1 + ρtρt−1ρt−2 + · · ·+ ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1} <∞.
(1) If γt
a.s−−−→
t→∞ 0, then Xt
a.s−−−→
t→∞ σ¯.
(2) If γt
P−−−→
t→∞ 0, then Xt
P−−−→
t→∞ σ¯.
(3) If γt
Lp−−−→
t→∞ 0, then Xt
Lp−−−→
t→∞ σ¯.
(4) If we assume
(7.3) Xt = AtXt−1 + Et(γt −Xt−1)
where now (γt)t≥1 are iid and integrable and in addition to (7.2) we assume that
(7.4)
∑
t≥1
(|At −At−1|∞ + |Et − Et−1)|∞) <∞.
Then,
(7.5) Xt converges in distribution as t→∞.
(5) Furthermore, if γt is integrable but not constant almost surely, then, without condition (7.4), the
conclusion of (7.5) does not hold.
Observe here the fact that in the last part of the Theorem we incorporated the constant σ¯ into
γt. The convergence is in distribution sense and thus it does not lead to convergence as in the
previous cases. Even if we assume that γt is of the form σ¯ + γt, the convergence will not be to σ¯
alone. Thus this is a different convergence scenario and in spirit is not of the same form as the
other cases.
Proof. (1) From our base model in terms of Yt is
(7.6) Yt = (At − Et)Yt−1 + Etγt.
From this we get
(7.7) |Yt|∞ ≤ ρt|Yt−1|∞ + C|γt|∞.
If we assume that |γt|∞ a.s−−−→
t→∞ 0, then we get that |Yt|
a.s−−−→
t→∞ 0. Indeed, this becomes a
purely deterministic statement. For a given  > 0, we can find that |γt|∞ ≤  for all t ≥ t.
Then,
|Yt|∞ ≤ ρt|Yt−1|∞ + C ∀t ≥ t.
Using the previous inequalities for t− 1, t− 2, . . . , t gives that
|Yt|∞ ≤ (
t∏
s=t
ρs)|Yt−1|∞ + C(1 + ρt + · · ·+
t∏
s=t
ρs).
From (7.2) we obtain in the first place that for some constant A > 0,
(7.8) A ≥ ρt + ρtρt−1 + · · ·+ ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1.
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We recall here the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, which states that for any real numbers
a1, a2, . . . , at and b1, b2, . . . , bt, we have(
t∑
i=1
a2i
)(
t∑
i=1
b2i
)
≥
(
t∑
i=1
aibi
)2
and in particular this implies that for any ai > 0,
(7.9)
(
t∑
i=1
ai
)(
t∑
i=1
1
ai
)
≥ t2.
Now we can write using (7.9) that
A ≥ ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1(1 + 1
ρ1
+
1
ρ1ρ2
+ · · ·+ 1
ρ1ρ2 . . . ρt−1
)
≥ ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1 t
2
1 + ρ1 + ρ1ρ2 + · · ·+ ρ1ρ2 . . . ρt
≥ ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1 t
2
tA
where we used the fact that from (7.8), we have that ρ1ρ2 . . . ρs ≤ A for any s ≥ 1. Notice
here that we need to distinguish here two cases, namely ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1 > 0 and ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1 =
0. The above inequality works for the former case, but in both cases we obtain that
(7.10) ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1 ≤ A
2
t
which yields that ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1 converges to 0. Thus in this case we get
|Yt|∞ a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0.
(2) If we only assume a weaker condition, namely that γt
P−−−→
t→∞ 0 (only convergence in proba-
bility), then iterating (7.7) we obtain
(7.11) |Yt|∞ ≤ (
t∏
s=1
ρs)|Y0|∞ +
t∑
s=0
(
t∏
i=t−s+1
ρi)|γt−s|∞
with the convention that
∏t
i=t+1 ρi = 1.
To finish the proof of we use the following Lemma with ut = |γt|∞.
Lemma 7. Let (un)n≥1 be a random sequence such that
un
P−−−→
n→∞ 0(7.12)
P(sup
n≥1
|un| <∞) = 1.(7.13)
Then, under the assumption (7.2), we have the convergence
∑t
i=1 ρtρt−1 . . . ρt−i+1ut−i
P−−−→
t→∞ 0.
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Proof. For the argument denote for simplicity of writing ηt,i = ρtρt−i . . . ρt−i+1. The first
observation here is that condition (7.21) gives that for any t ≥ s, using (7.9), we proceed as
in the proof of (7.10) to argue that
A ≥ ρt + ρtρt−1 + · · ·+ ρtρt−1 . . . ρt−s+1
= ρtρt−1 . . . ρt−s+1
(
1 +
1
ρt−s+1
+
1
ρt−s+1ρt−s
+ · · ·+ 1
ρt−s+1ρt−s . . . ρt−1
)
≥ ρtρt−1 . . . ρt−s+1 s
2
1 + ρt−s+1 + ρt−s+1ρt−s + · · ·+ ρt−s+1ρt−s . . . ρt−1
≥ ρtρt−1 . . . ρt−s+1 s
2
As
.
Notice that we used the fact that (from (7.8)) for any s ≤ t, ρtρt−1 . . . ρs ≤ A. Therefore
(7.14) ρtρt−1 . . . ρt−s+1 ≤ A
2
s
and using this and again (7.8) for t replaced by t− s we obtain that
(7.15) ρtρt−1 . . . ρt−s+1(1 + ρt−s + ρt−s−1ρt−s−2 + · · ·+ ρt−s . . . ρ1) ≤ A
3
s
.
Now, we fix s ≤ t and write
|
t∑
i=1
ηt,iut−i| ≤
s∑
i=1
ηt,i|ut−i|+
t∑
i=s+1
ηt,i|ut−i|
Now, for a given  and |∑ti=1 ηt,iut−i| > , we must have that at least one of the above
sums must be at least /2, thus, we can write for each fixed  > 0,
(7.16) P(|
t∑
i=1
ηt,iut−i| > ) ≤ P(
s∑
i=1
ηt,i|ut−i| ≥ /2) + P(
t∑
i=s+1
ηt,i|ut−i| > /2).
The next step is to use the boundedness of ut. Take arbitrary δ,M > 0, (here δ is meant to
be small and M to be large) and then set
AM = {|un| ≤M for all n ≥ 1}.
From the condition (7.13) we definitely have that P(AM ) converges to 1 as M tends to
infinity. Therefore we can continue the equation (7.16) with
P(|
t∑
i=1
ηt,iut−i| > ) ≤ P(
s∑
i=1
ηt,i|ut−i| ≥ /2) + P(
t∑
i=s+1
ηt,i|ut−i| > /2, AM ) + P(
t∑
i=s+1
ηt,i|ut−i| > /2, AcM )
≤
s∑
i=1
P(ηt,i|ut−i| ≥ /(2s)) + P(M
t∑
i=s+1
ηt,i > /2, AM ) + P(AcM )
≤
s∑
i=1
P(ηt,i|ut−i| ≥ /(2s)) + P(
t∑
i=s+1
ηt,i > /(2M)) + P(AcM )
≤
s∑
i=1
P(ηt,i|ut−i| ≥ /(2s)) + P(A+ 1
s
> /(2M)) + P(AcM )
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where in the passage from the first line to the second we used the union bound, more
precisely, if we have
∑s
i=1 ηt,i|ut−i| ≥ /2 then at least one of the terms must be ≥ /(2s)
plus the union bound on the probability. Finally in passage to the last line we simply used
(7.15).
Next we can freeze for now , s,M and use the fact that for each i, ηt,iut−i converges to 0
in probability since ηt,i is bounded by A > 0 and use (7.15) to argue that the limit as t→∞
we gain that
0 ≤ lim sup
t→∞
P(|
t∑
i=1
ηiut−i| > ) ≤ P(A+ 1
s
> /(2M)) + P(AcM ).
For large s, obviously P(A+1s > /(2M)) = 0 and thus we arrive at
0 ≤ lim sup
t→∞
P(|
t∑
i=1
ηiut−i| > ) ≤ P(AcM ).
From this, we take the limit as M →∞ and using (7.12)
0 ≤ lim sup
t→∞
P(|
t∑
i=1
ηiut−i| > ) = 0
which means convergence of
∑t
i=1 ηiut−i to 0 in probability. 
Now let’s return to the proof of the Theorem.
(3) For the Lp convergence we just need to take expectation of (7.11).
(4) For the convergence in distribution we start by writing
Xt = BtXt−1 + Etγt
where Bt = At − Et. The idea is that because γt are in L1 so are all the variables Xt. We are
going to use the Wasserstein distance to control the difference between the distributions of
Xt and Xt−1.
The basic idea is that in a slightly modified Wasserstein distanceD we have a contraction
in the sense that there exists some ρ < 1 such that
(7.17) D(Xt, Xt−1) ≤ ρD(Xt−1, Xt−2).
For the sake of completeness we define here for two n-dimensional random variables,X,Y
or better for their distributions µX , µY ,
(7.18) D(X,Y ) =
(
inf
α
∫
|x− y|∞α(dx, dy)
)
= inf
α
E[|X˜ − Y˜ |∞]
where α is a 2n-dimensional distribution with marginals µX and µY and X˜ Y˜ are two
random variables on the same probability space (we call it a coupling) with the same dis-
tributions as X , respectively Y . The second equality follows easily from taking X˜ and Y˜ to
be the projections from pii : Rn × Rn → Rn, given by pi1(x, y) = x while pi2(x, y) = y. To go
from the pair (X˜, Y˜ ) back to the measure α, we just need to take α to be the distribution of
the pair (X˜, Y˜ ).
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The standard Wasserstein distance is defined as
W1(X,Y ) =
(
inf
α
∫
|x− y|α(dx, dy)
)
= inf E[|X˜ − Y˜ |].
Because any two norms on Rn are equivalent, we can find two constants c1, c2 > 0 such
that
c1W1(X,Y ) ≤ D(X,Y ) ≤ c2W1(X,Y ).
It is known that W1 gives the topology of weak converge on the space of probability mea-
sures with finite first moment (that is
∫ |x|µ(dx) <∞). Due to the above inequality we also
infer the completeness with respect to the metric D on the same space P1(Rn).
To carry on this program we define for a distribution µ, the following map
Ft(µ) = the distribution of gt(Xt−1, γ) with gt(x, λ) = (At − Et)x+ Etλ, x, λ,∈ Rn,
where X is a random variable with distribution µ and γ is a random variable independent
of X and having the same distribution as the sequence γt.
Now we want to look at D(Xt, Xt−1) and estimate it from above. To do this assume
that we have a coupling between Xt−1 and Xt−2 and then we can create an optimal cou-
pling between Xt and Xt−1 (with respect to the distance D, which certainly exists from
Kantorovich general result) and then take γ independent of both Xt−1 and Xt−2 and use
Xt −Xt−1 = (At − Et)Xt−1 + Etγ − (At−1 − Et−1)Xt−2 − Et−1γ
= (At − Et)(Xt−1 −Xt−2) + (At −At−1 − Et + Et−1)Xt−2 + (Et − Et−1)γ.
Taking | · |∞ and the expectation both sides we get the estimate
E[|Xt −Xt−1|∞] ≤ E[|(At − Et)(Xt−1 −Xt−2)|∞] + E[|(At −At−1 − Et + Et−1)Xt−2|∞] + E[|(Et − Et−1)γ|∞]
≤ ρtE[|Xt−1 −Xt−2|∞] + αt(E[|Xt−2|∞] + E[|γ|∞])
(7.19)
where we denoted by
αt = |At −At−1|∞ + |Et − Et−1|∞.
Notice that in the time independent case, the terms αt is 0, which implies that Xt con-
verges in distribution.
In the general case we need to use the extra conditions from (7.4). From the above
considerations we actually show first that the expectation of Xt obeys the equation (keep
in mind that supt≥1 |Et|∞ ≤ A+ 1)
E[|Xt|∞] ≤ ρtE[|Xt−1|∞] + (A+ 1)E[|γ|∞].
Using this and the standard iterations combined with (7.2) we get that
sup
t
E[|Xt|∞] < C <∞.
On the other hand from (7.19) we get that
(7.20) D(Xt, Xt−1) ≤ ρtD(Xt−1, Xt−2) + Cαt.
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Using this and a simple iteration it leads to
D(Xt, Xt−1) ≤ ρtρt−1 . . . ρ2D(X1, X0) + C(αt + αt−1ρt + αt−1ρtρt−1 + · · ·+ α1ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1).
In particular, summing this over t from t to t+ s, leads to
D(Xt, Xt+s) ≤
s∑
i=1
ρt+i−1 . . . ρ2D(X1, X0) + C
t+s∑
k=1
αk
s∑
i=1
ρt+iρt+i−1 . . . ρk.
According to (7.15) we conclude that the sum
∑s
i=1 ρt+i−1 . . . ρ2 converges to 0 as s, t→∞.
We will show that the other sum also converges to 0 as both t, s → ∞. To this end notice
that from (7.4), we can set
βt =
∑
i≥t
αi
and write αt = βt − βt+1. After rearrangements, this leads to
t+s∑
k=1
αk
s∑
i=1
ρt+iρt+i−1 . . . ρk = β1ρt+sρt+s−1 . . . ρ1 + β2ρt+sρt+s−1 . . . ρ1 + · · ·+ βt+s.
The first term converges to 0 because of (7.14) and the rest, converges to 0 because of the
above Lemma thanks to the fact that βt converges to 0, this converges to 0.
This proves the convergence in distribution.
(5) Next we show that the condition (7.4) is also a necessary condition. Indeed, if we take the
one dimensional case with
Xt = Xt−1 + t(γt −Xt−1)
such that
|t − t−1| = 1/(10t) for t ≥ 1
In fact we will choose
t = 1/2 + c
t∑
k=1
wi/i
and we will choose wi = ±1 in the following fashion. First we take all w1, w2, . . . , wτ1 such
that τ1 ≤ 3/4 but 3/4 < τ1 + c/(τ1 + 1). Notice that we can do this because the harmonic
series is divergent. Now, we choose τ2 > τ1 such that wτ1+1 = wτ1+2 = · · · = wτ2 = −1 and
τ2 − 1/(10(τ2 + 1)) < 1/4 ≤ τ2 . Now we choose τ3 > τ2 and wt2+1 = · · · = wt3 = 1 such
that τ3 ≤ 3/4 < τ3 + c/(τ3 + 1). Then we choose τ4 > τ3 such that wτ3+1 = wτ3+2 = · · · =
wτ4 = −1 such that τ4 − 1/(10(τ4 + 1)) < 1/4 ≤ τ4 . And we continue inductively. Thus
we have defined a sequence t such that
1/4 ≤ t ≤ 3/4 such that {t}t≥1 = [1/4, 3/4].
In other words the limit points of the sequence t is just the interval [1/4, 3/4] and obviously
the condition (7.2) is fulfilled.
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With this choice of the sequence t, we claim that the sequence Xt does not converge in
distribution. Indeed the argument is based on the simple observation that if it were, then
taking the characteristic functions φXt we would get
φXt(ξ) = φXt−1((1− t)ξ)φγ(tξ).
As a recall, φX(ξ) = E[eiξX ] for any ξ ∈ R. In particular this means that if Xt converges
to some random variable Y , then taking a subsequence tn for which tn −−−→n→∞ x we obtain
that
(7.21) φY (ξ) = φY ((1− x)ξ)φγ(xξ) for any x ∈ [1/4, 3/4].
Under the assumption that γ is integrable we claim that γ must be constant and also X is
going to be the same constant. To carry this out we argue that for x = 1/4 and x = 3/4 we
get that
φγ(3ξ/4)
φγ(ξ/4)
=
φY (3ξ/4)
φY (ξ/4)
.
Replacing ξ by 4ξ/3 we arrive at
φγ(ξ)
φγ(ξ/3)
=
φY (ξ)
φY (ξ/3)
.
Replacing here ξ by ξ/3, ξ/32, . . . , ξ/3n and multiplying these we get that
φγ(ξ)
φγ(ξ/3n)
=
φY (ξ)
φY (ξ/3n)
.
Now letting n → ∞ and using the fact that for any random variable Z, φZ(ξ/3n) −−−→
n→∞ 1
we obtain that
φγ(ξ) = φY (ξ),
in other words, Y has the same distribution as γ. Using this in (7.21) with x = 1/2 we
arrive at
φY (ξ) = φY (ξ/2)
2.
Iterating this we get
φY (ξ) = φY (ξ/2
n)2
n
which can be written alternatively as
(7.22) φY (ξ) = φY1+Y2+···+Y2n
2n
(ξ),
where Y1, Y2, . . . are iid with the same distribution as Y . Since Y and γ have the same
distributions and γ is integrable, it follows that Y is also integrable. This in particular
implies from the law of large numbers that Y1+Y2+···+Y2n2n converges almost surely to E[Y ] =
E[γ]. Since convergence almost surely implies convergence in distribution, we get that
(7.23) φY (ξ) = φE[Y ](ξ),
in other words, Y must be constant. This implies that γ is also constant which then finishes
the argument.

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FIGURE 2. When the noise is Gaussian, thenXt converges to a Normal distribution.
This is the picture on the left. The joint plot illustrates the case for two agents who
learn from each other with A and E fixed. Variable x1 and x2 represent agents 1
and 2. The right hand side picture represents the convergence results for γt taking
only values ±1 with equal probability and independently of one another in each
component.
Remark 8. We need to point out that integrability is key for the conclusion of the last part of Theorem 6.
If we drop the integrability condition, then the passage from (7.22) to (7.23) is not possible. In fact, if we
take (γt)t≥1 to be all iid Cauchy(1) and X0 = 0, then Xt will also follow a Cauchy(1) random variable for
any choice of 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 with 1 > 0. Certainly in this case we do not need any other assumptions on 
or ρt to get convergence. We leave as an open problem the optimal conditions under which the model (7.3)
converges as t→∞.
7.1. Simulations for convergence to distribution. Let us illustrate Theorem 6 and result 7.5. Sup-
pose that the noise γt is a Normal random variable. Numerical simulations show thatXt converges
to a Gaussian random variable for each component – figure 2.
The the asymptotic distribution is Gaussian centered around the true value σ¯. The main point
is that we do not need to scale Xt.
Suppose, the iid (γt)s are vectors of just +1 or −1, then Xt converges in distribution. In fig-
ure 2, the simulated distribution looks distinctly non-Gaussian. For other noises non-standard
distributions can occur.
8. NONLINEAR LEARNING
While Degroot updating is retained in this section, we develop nonlinear models of learning.
Instead of E , there is a non-linear function.
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Definition 9. The learning function ft : Rn → Rn is continuous on some compact convex subset K ⊆ Rn
and differentiable on its interior, with f(0) = 0. Component wise it is
ft

x1
...
xn
 =

ft(x1)
...
ft(xn)
 .
Notice that the update or feedback is now varying with time. Learning or feed back stops when
σ¯ −Xt = 0, so the condition ft(0) = 0 ensures this. The updating rule for agent i becomes
xit+1 =
n∑
j=1
(aij)tx
j
t + ft,i(σ¯ − xit).
Moreover, the weights matrix A is also time varying. Previous sections showed convergence re-
sults of linear updating ft,i = i, a fixed scalar. Actual updating of feedback can be be quite
complex, and having a nonlinear feedback or learning rule allows us to expand the linear model.
Theorem 10. For ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and ∀t ≥ 0, suppose the learning function satisfies
(8.1) 0 < inf f ′t,i ≤ sup f ′t,i < 2(aii)t,
and if we denote
ρt = sup
i
sup
ξ
(|(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξ)|+ 1− (aii)t)
we assume that
(8.2) sup
t≥1
(ρt + ρtρt−1 + · · ·+ ρtρt−1ρt−2 . . . ρ1) <∞.
(1) With the dynamics
Xt = AtXt−1 + ft(σ¯ −Xt−1),
consensus is reached and limt→∞Xt = σ¯.
(2) If the evolution is given by
Xt = AtXt−1 + ft(σ¯ + γt −Xt−1)
under the same assumption as in (8.1), then γt −−−→
t→∞ 0 yields that Xt −−−→t→∞ σ¯. (If the noise con-
verges to zero a.s, in probability or in L1, then Xt converges accordingly).
(3) Again assume (8.2) and
(8.3) Xt = AtXt−1 + ft(γt −Xt−1)
where the sequence (γt)t≥1 is assumed to be iid and integrable. If in addition we have that
(8.4)
∑
t≥1
(
|At −At−1|∞ + max
i
sup
ξ∈R
|f ′t,i(ξ)− f ′t−1,i(ξ)|
)
<∞,
then Xt converges in distribution as t→∞.
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Notice that the last part of the result above does not involve the σ¯ because it is actually hidden
in the sequence γ. As opposed to the other two cases, the convergence is only in distribution and
in principle that is implicitly defined, it is not a constant variable as in the previous cases.
Proof. (1) First we subtract σ¯ from both sides of the dynamics equation. As A is stochastic,
A(t)σ¯ = σ¯, hence
(Xt+1 − σ¯) = A(t)(Xt − σ¯) + ft(σ¯ −Xt−1).
Second, we recast the equation using the infinity-norm
|Xt+1 − σ¯|∞ = sup
i
|(Xt+1 − σ¯)i|.
For individual i, the updating rule becomes
(Xt+1 − σ¯)i =
n∑
j=1
(aij)t(Xt−1 − σ¯)j + ft(σ¯ − (Xt−1)i)
=
(
(aii)t − ft,i(σ¯ − (Xt−1)i)
(σ¯ − (Xt−1)i)
)
(Xt−1 − σ¯)i +
n∑
j 6=i
(aij)t(Xt−1 − σ¯)j
≤ (|(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξi)||Xt−1 − σ¯|i)+ n∑
j 6=i
(aij)t|Xt−1 − σ¯|j
≤ (|(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξi)|+ 1− (aii)t) |Xt−1 − σ¯|∞
≤ sup
i
sup
ξ
(|(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξi)|+ 1− (aii)t) |Xt−1 − σ¯|∞
The second equality follows because the learning function is continuous and differentiable
hence
ft,i(x)− ft,i(0) = (x− 0)f ′t,i(ξ) =⇒
ft,i(x)
x
= f ′t,i(ξ).
for some ξi ∈ (0, x) by the Mean value theorem.
By assumption
0 < inf f ′t,i ≤ sup f ′t,i < 2(aii)t
but this is equivalent there being some 0 < δi < 1 such that ∀ξ ∈ R
(8.5) δi < f ′t,i(ξ) < 2(aii)t − δi.
The above condition gives us two cases to consider. In the first case, ignoring depen-
dence on t, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and ξ
aii > f
′
i(ξ) (case 1) in which case, |aii − f ′i(ξ)|+ 1− (aii) = 1− f ′t,i(ξ) < 1− δi
In the second case,
aii ≤ f ′i(ξ) (case 1) in which case, |aii − f ′i(ξ)|+ 1− (aii) = 1 + f ′t,i(ξ)− 2aii < 1− δi.
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Thus we obtain that
sup
i
sup
ξ
(|(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξi)|+ 1− (aii)t) < 1−min
i
δi < 1
thus we have a contraction in |Xt − σ¯|∞ and consequently,
lim
t→∞Xt = σ¯.
(2) The deviation equation from consensus is
(Xt+1 − σ¯) = A(t)(Xt − σ¯) + ft(σ¯ + γt −Xt−1).
Essentially the same steps follow as the in the proof with no noise
(Xt+1 − σ¯)i =
n∑
j=1
(aij)t(Xt−1 − σ¯)j + ft,i(σ¯ + γt − (Xt−1)i)
=
(
(aii)t − ft,i(σ¯ + γt − (Xt−1)i)
(σ¯ + γt − (Xt−1)i)
)
(Xt−1 − σ¯ − γt)i +
n∑
j 6=i
(aij)t(Xt−1 − σ¯)j
=
(
(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξ)
)
(Xt−1 − σ¯)i +
n∑
j 6=i
(aij)t(Xt−1 − σ¯)j + γtf ′t,i(ξ)
=
(
(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξ)
)
(Xt−1 − σ¯)i + (1− (aii)t)(Xt−1 − σ¯)j + γtf ′t,i(ξ)
≤ (|(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξi)||Xt−1 − σ¯|i)+ (1− (aii)t)|Xt−1 − σ¯|j + |γt|f ′t,i(ξ)
≤ (|(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξi)|+ 1− (aii)t) |Xt−1 − σ¯|∞ + |γt|f ′t,i(ξ)
≤ sup
i
sup
ξ
(|(aii)t − f ′t,i(ξi)|+ 1− (aii)t) |Xt−1 − σ¯|∞ + C|γt|
The rest of the proof follows as in the proof of Theorem 6, more precisely, following the
same argument starting with (7.7). In all instances the convergence follows the same argu-
ments as in the linear case.
(3) First observe that from (8.3) we get
E[|Xt|∞] ≤ ρtE[|Xt−1|∞] + 2E[γ].
From this, iterating and using (8.2) as in the linear case we obtain that
sup
t≥1
E[|Xt|∞] = C <∞.
To treat the case where γt are all iid, we follow the same argument as the linear case.
Here we have to use in the first place the distance defined in (7.18) and the argument for
the estimate ofD(Xt, Xt−1) we need to take a for any coupling X˜t−1 and X˜t−2 the coupling
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AtX˜t−1 + ft(γ − X˜t−1) and At−1X˜t−2 + ft−1(γ − X˜t−2). Then,
D(Xt, Xt−1) ≤ E[|AtX˜t−1 + ft(γ − X˜t−1)−At−1X˜t−2 + ft−1(γ − X˜t−2)|∞]
≤ E[|AtX˜t−1 + ft(γ − X˜t−1)− (AtX˜t−2 + ft(γ − X˜t−2)|∞]
+ E[|AtX˜t−2 + ft(γ − X˜t−2)− (At−1X˜t−2 + ft−1(γ − X˜t−2))|∞]
≤ ρtE[|X˜t−1 − X˜t−2|∞ +
(
|At −At−1|∞ + max
i
sup
ξ∈R
|f ′t,i(ξ)− f ′t−1,i(ξ)|
)
E[|Xt−2|∞]
≤ ρtD(Xt−1, Xt−2) + C
(
|At −At−1|∞ + max
i
sup
ξ∈R
|f ′t,i(ξ)− f ′t−1,i(ξ)|
)
.
From this we proceed exactly in the same way as in the proof of the linear case, more
precisely, the same proof following (7.20) to show that Xt is Cauchy in the metric D.

Remark 11. Matrix A(t) and learning function ft are allowed to be time dependent or slowly varying.
They could be random but in a controlled way. Were A and f to be fixed in time, the above result would still
hold. So the constant case is a special case of what we have shown.
Continuity of the learning function ft is essential. We give an example of a situation where it
breaks down.
Example 12. Consider the sign function
sign(x) =

−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0.
If the learning f were the signum function, then the dynamics would be
Xt = A(t)Xt−1 + E sign(σ¯ −Xt−1).
Consensus in this case would not be achieved. One can plainly see this in the one dimensional case of
At = 1, σ = 1, Yt = Xt − σ, Y0 = 1 and take 1/3 < E < 1/2. With this setup we get
Y1 = 1− E , Y2 = 1− 2E , Y3 = 1− 3E , Y4 = 1− 2E , Y5 = 1− 3E , . . .
which shows that Yt becomes periodic, thus not convergent. We can extend this behaviour to more general
situations of course, though this periodic pattern still follows.
9. AVERAGE DYNAMICS
The previous model with learning assumes σ¯ is already known. In the case where the true σ
is not a priori assumed to exist, one of the possibilities is to replace σ by some average of all the
players and the model becomes
(9.1) Xt = AtXt−1 + Et(Xt−1 −Xt−1).
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where Xt−1 is the average of the sigmas of all the players. On a pure information level, this seems
more satisfactory. There is no outside knowledge, all information is entirely contained within the
interactions. For a large number of players, this makes perfect sense.
However, in this case the main issue is to show that the model converges. To do this we interpret
U for any vector U as
U =

U1+···+Un
n
...
U1+···+Un
n
 =

1
n + · · ·+ 1n
...
1
n + · · ·+ 1n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆

U1
...
Un
 .
The system becomes now
Xt = (At + Et∆− Et)Xt−1.(9.2)
We want to show that Xt converges to a vector which is a multiple of
1 =

1
...
1
 .
9.1. Fixed A and E . In this section we give an algebraic approach of the case of A and E constant
in time.
Theorem 13. If A is an n× n stochastic matrix and E is such that 0 < i < n
n− 1aii for any i and
Xt = (A+ E∆− E)Xt−1
then Xt −−−→
t→∞ λ1 = λ

1
...
1
. Convergence is also exponentially fast.
Proof. Note that ∆Xt−1 = Xt−1. Since
E∆− E =

− 1(n−1)n 1n · · · 1n
2
n − 2(n−1)n · · · 2n
. . . . . .
 ,
it means that
A+ E∆− E =

a11 − 1(n−1)n 1n + a12 · · · 1n + a1n
a21 +
2
n a22 − 2(n−1)n · · · 2n + a2n
...
...
 .
For the time homogenous case, we require B = A+ E∆− E to be a stochastic matrix. It suffices
to enforce the condition
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0 < i <
n
n− 1aii.
In this case, B is a stochastic matrix and we are requiring bii > 0 or positive self belief. The system
now becomes
Xt = BXt−1.
To show thatXt converges, we can putB in Jordan formB = J−1DJ , whereD is a block Jordan
matrix. If we let Yt = JXt, we obtain the equivalent system
Yt = DYt−1.
From the Perron-Frobenius theorem (notice here that indeed B has positive entries since i > 0)
we know that 1 is a single eigenvalue and all other eigenvalues are in absolute value less than 1.
Thus
(9.3) D =

1 0
0 Ji 0
0
. . . Jn

Where Ji corresponds to Jordan block
λi 1 0
λi 1 0
. . . . . .
1
λi

.
In fact, from the above representation, (Yt)1 = (Yt−1)1, which means that the first entry of Yt does
not change. The rest of the analysis reduces to systems of the form
Yt =

λ 1 0
λ 1 0
. . . . . .
λ
Yt−1
with |λ| < 1. For such a situation we use the concrete expression of
Yt =

λ 1
λ 1
. . . . . .
λ

t
Y0.
Now as |λ| < 1, we can show that with
U =

0 1 0
0
. . . 1
0

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(this is the matrix with 1’s in the super-diagonal) that we have

λ 1
. . . 1
λ

t
= (λI+ U)t =
t∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
(λI)t−kUk.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to see that Un = 0, thus in the above sum we have to collect
only the terms k < n, in other words

λ 1
. . . 1
λ

t
= (λI+ U)t =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
(λI)t−kUk −−−→
t→∞ 0
because |λ| < 1. The conclusion is that for 0 < i < nn−1aii we have that Xt converges to a vector
v. From the equation Xt = BXt−1 we get that v = Bv, which from Perron-Frobenius shows that
v = λ

1
1
...
1
 . 
9.2. Time varying A(t) and E(t). Time varying here allows for some randomness in that the en-
tries can change over time but not drastically enough to alter the structure of the matrix. In the
later sections, we will consider matrices which are allowed to be truly random with less restric-
tions on entries. In the previous section A and E were constant. We now look at the behaviour
of time varying stochastic matrices and learning rates. We have the general model still given by
(9.1), which reduces to
Xt = (At + Et∆− Et)Xt−1
or, if we set
(9.4) Bt = At + Et∆− Et,
the above system becomes Xt = B(t)Xt−1.
We will just refer to this system as Xt = BtXt−1 for notation purposes. For the general case of
time varying matrices, we need a different idea since the Jordan form of Bt produces a matrix Jt
which depends on t. The argument used above fails because for each t a different corresponding
Jt exists.
Another way is to look at how much the components of Xt differ from each other. A quantifier
for this is the oscillation we introduce now.
Definition 14. Define for a vector X ,
osc(X) = max
i,j
|Xi −Xj |
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and for an n× n matrix A, the Dobrushin coefficient by
δ(A) =
1
2
max
i,j=1
n∑
k=1
|aik − ajk|.
We provide here a Lemma which is classical but we provide also the proof for reader’s conve-
nience.
Lemma 15. If A is a matrix whose row sums are all equal and X = AY , then
(9.5) osc(X) ≤ δ(A) osc(Y )
In particular, if A is a stochastic matrix, then
osc(X) ≤ osc(Y ).
Proof. We can write Yi = (Ymin +Ymax)/2 +Zi with Zi ∈ [− osc(Y )/2, osc(Y )/2]. Thus, because the
sums on rows does not change, we actually have
Xi −Xj =
n∑
k=1
(aik − ajk)Zk.
Taking the absolute values and using the fact that |Zk| ≤ osc(Y )/2, gives the result.

Before we state the next result, we define
1 =

1
1
...
1
 , ∆ = 1n2 I I> = 1nI where I =

1 1 . . . 1
1 1 . . . 1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1 . . . 1

Theorem 16. Assume we have the model with deterministic stochastic matrices At, γt random variables
and
Xt = AtXt−1 + Et(Xt−1 −Xt−1 + γt),
with
(9.6) 0 ≤ (i)t ≤ n
n− 1(aii)t ∀i = 1, · · · , n,∀t ≥ 1.
(1) Let Bt = At + Et(∆− I) and assume that ρt = δ(Bt) > 0 for each t ≥ 1 and
(9.7)
t∏
s=1
ρs −−−→
t→∞ 0, and γt = 0, t ≥ 0,
then
(9.8)
t∏
s=1
Bs −−−→
t→∞ C
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where for some ν1, ν2, . . . , νn ≥ 0 with
∑t
s=1 νs = 1,
(9.9) C =

ν1 ν2 . . . νn
ν1 ν2 . . . νn
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ν1 ν2 . . . νn
 .
If γt = 0 for all t ≥ 1, then, for some λ > 0
(9.10) Xt
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ λ1
(2) Assume now that we have
(9.11) sup
t≥1
{ρt + ρtρt−1 + ρtρt−1ρt−2 + · · ·+ ρtρt−1 . . . ρ1} <∞.
(a) If
∑
t≥1 |γt|∞ <∞ almost surely, then Xt a.s.−−−→t→∞ λ1 for some random variable λ ≥ 0.
(b) If
∑
t≥1 |γt|∞ converges in Lp, then Xt L
p−−−→
t→∞ λ1 for some random variable λ ∈ L
p.
(3) Assume that (9.11) holds true and that
(9.12) Et −−−→
t→∞ E
and that (γt)t≥1 is a sequence of iid random variables with mean µ ∈ Rn and covariance matrix Σ.
Then,
(9.13)
Xt − E[Xt]√
t
=⇒ N(0, C>E>ΣEC)
in distribution sense.
Remark 17. (1) Notice here that because of our assumption (9.6) we get that
0 < ρt = δ(At + Et(∆− I)) < 1
and in particular we get another proof of the time independent model as well.
(2) For any matrix B with sums of rows equal to 1, which is the case of B = At + Et(∆− I), using the
fact that a ∧ b = a+b−|a−b|2 , we have another expression for
δ(B) = 1−min
i,j
n∑
k=1
bik ∧ bjk.
For instance, if we define
ω(B) = max
i,j
(1− bij)
and if B is a stochastic matrix with all positive entries, then
δ(B) ≤ 1− ω(B) < 1.
This is our situation generated by the condition (9.6).
(3) The convergence in probability of the series
∑
t≥1 |γt|∞ is the same as almost sure convergence, and
this is the reason why this is left out.
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(4) As opposed to the case of Theorem 6, this time, to guarantee consensus in the long run for Xt, we
need the hypothesis of convergence of
∑
t≥1 |γt|∞. Just convergence of γt to 0 is not enough in this
case. For instance, if γt = (1/t)e, and X1 = 0, with At and Ei = E1 for all i independent of time t,
then Xt = c(
∑t
i=1 1/i)e which is clearly not convergent.
(5) Contrary to the case of Theorem 6, if we take γt to be iid, we do not get converge in distribution of
Xt itself. For instance if we assume that X0 = 0 and At and Et are constant such that the diagonal
of E is also constant, then for γt = ute, we get that Xt = c(
∑t
i=1 ut)e. This is not convergent
unless ut = 0 a.s.. However this is complemented by the last part of the Theorem which show that
properly scaled, this convergences to a multidimensional normal random variable.
(6) Notice that the covariance matrix of the normal limit (9.13), is actually rank one because the matrix
C is rank one. Thus the normal random variable is actually supported on a line.
Proof. We will show in fact first (9.13) and then (9.9) follows by taking initial vectors to be the
coordinate vectors of Rn.
We prove the general situation and we take with the notation Bt = At + Et(∆− I),
Xt = BtXt−1 + γ˜t where γ˜t = Etγt
from which we get in the first place that
(9.14) osc(Xt) ≤ δ(Bt) osc(Xt−1) + osc(γ˜t) = ρt osc(Xt−1) + osc(γ˜t)
and with the same argument from Theorem 6, under (9.7) we obtain that osc(Xt) converges to 0
under the convergence of
∑
t≥1 |γt|∞ (in both a.s. case and also in Lp sense). On the other hand,
since Bt is a stochastic matrix, we have also that
(9.15) (Xt−1)min + (γ˜t)min ≤ (Xt)min ≤ (Xt)max ≤ (Xt−1)max + (γ˜t)max.
(1) From this, if we take γt = 0, then (9.15) together with (9.14) gives that Xt converges to a
multiple of the vector 1. Thus, taking for X0 one of the basis vectors of Rn, and using the
fact that
Xt =
t∏
s=1
BsX0
we obtain that the matrix
∏t
s=1Bs converges to a matrix C which has repeated rows.
(2) We need here the following rewriting of (9.15)
(9.16)
(Xt)max −
t∑
s=1
(γ˜t)max ≤ (Xt−1)max −
t−1∑
s=1
(γ˜t)max and (Xt−1)min −
t−1∑
s=1
(γ˜t)min ≤ (Xt)min −
t∑
s=1
(γ˜t)min
(a) If
∑
t≥1 |γt|∞ <∞ almost surely, then using (9.16) and get that (Xt)min −
∑t
s=1(γ˜t)min
is convergent (monotone and bounded). In a similar way we also have that (Xt)max −∑t
s=1(γ˜t)max is convergent. Therefore, because the oscillation goes to zero we get that
Xt is almost surely convergent. Combined with the fact that osc(Xt) converges to 0,
this implies the convergence of Xt in almost sure sense.
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(b) If
∑
t≥1 |γt|∞ converges in some Lp, then it is also a.s. convergent. Consequently,
we have that
∑
t≥1 |γt|∞ < ∞ thus we can invoke the previous part to argue that Xt
converges a.s. to a random variable X .
To show the Lp convergence, we first notice that Xt is in Lp for every p (just from the
recurrence relation). Next, using (9.14), we have that osc(Xt) converges to 0 in Lp. On
the other hand, for any s < t, we have
Xt −Xs = (
t∏
i=1
Bi −
s∏
i=1
Bi)X0 +
t∑
k=s+1
k∏
i=1
Biγ˜k.
Using this, the convergence of Bt to C and some standard estimates we get that for
some constant K > 0,
‖|Xt −Xs|∞‖p ≤ ‖
t∏
i=1
BiX0 −
s∏
i=1
BiX0‖p +K‖
t∑
k=s+1
|γk|‖p
This shows that the sequence (Xt)t≥0 is Cauchy in in Lp. In particular this means
the sequence is convergent in Lp and because it also converges almost surely it must
converge to the same limit.
(3) To show convergence in distribution we proceed as follows. We first observe that in the
case γt are normally distributed, the random variable Xt is actually normally distributed
with mean
µt =
t∏
k=1
BkX0 +
t∑
s=1
s∏
k=1
BkEsµ
and covariance matrix given by
Γt =
t∑
s=1
(
s∏
k=1
Bk)
>E>ΣE(
s∏
k=1
Bk).
Because
∏t
k=1Bk converges to C and Et converges to E , this means that
Γt
t
−−−→
t→∞ C
>E>ΣEC,
Therefore
Xt − E[Xt]√
t
=⇒ N(0, C>E>ΣEC).
On the other hand, if γt are not normal, we can take copies of Zt which are normal and
we can put all the variables γt and Zt on the same probability space. We will compare the
sums Xt with Yt, which we define by
Yt = BtYt−1 + EtZt.
with Y0 = X0. We certainly have in the first place that
E[Xt] = E[Yt] = B˜tX0 +
t∑
s=1
B˜sEsE[γs].
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where in order to simply the notation we set
B˜t =
t∏
s=1
Bs.
From this we can reduce the rest of the proof to the case of X0 = 0 and E[γt] = 0. These
do not change the covariance matrices of Xt and Yt which remain the same.
Next we will use the Lindberg argument which involves the comparison of Xt and Yt.
For a reference of this look at [Str00]. In the first place realize that
Xt =
t∑
s=1
B˜sEsγs while Yt =
t∑
s=1
B˜sEsZs.
Take now a smooth function φ : Rn → R with all bounded derivatives, and we will com-
pare
E
[
φ
(
Xt√
t
)]
− E
[
φ
(
Yt√
t
)]
=
t∑
s=1
(
E
[
φ
(
Ws + B˜sEsγs√
t
)]
− E
[
φ
(
Ws + B˜sEsZs√
t
)])
=
t∑
s=1
(
E
[
φ
(
Ws + B˜sEsγs√
t
)
− φ
(
Ws + B˜sEsZs√
t
)])(9.17)
with the definition
Ws =
s−1∑
i=1
B˜iEiZi +
t∑
i=s+1
B˜iEiγi.
Thus, Wk is independent of γk and Zk. Now for a smooth function we can use Taylor’s
formula with integral remainder,
φ(x+ y) = φ(x) +Dφ(x)(y) +
∫ 1
0
D2φ(x+ ty)(y, y)tdt
while using a Taylor’s formula to third order with integral remainder,
φ(x+ y) = φ(x) +Dφ(x)(y) +
1
2
D2φ(x)(y, y) +
1
2
∫ 1
0
D3φ(x+ ty))(y, y, y)t2dt.
We can combine both of these to write
φ(x+ y)− φ(x)−Dφ(x)(y)− 1
2
D2φ(x)(y, y) = R(x, y)
with
(9.18) R(x, y) ≤
‖D2φ‖∞|y|21
6‖D3φ‖∞|y|3
Going now back to the decomposition (9.17), using the independence ofWs from both γs
and also Zs and the fact that γs and Zs have the same mean and covariance, we can write∣∣∣∣∣E
[
φ
(
Ws + B˜sEsγs√
t
)
− φ
(
Ws + B˜sEsZs√
t
)]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ E
[∣∣∣∣∣R
(
Ws√
t
,
B˜sEsγs√
t
)∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣R
(
Ws√
t
,
B˜sEsZs√
t
)∣∣∣∣∣
]
.
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Now, for a given  > 0, we write
E
[∣∣∣∣∣R
(
Ws√
t
,
B˜sEsγs√
t
)∣∣∣∣∣
]
= E
[∣∣∣∣∣R
(
Ws√
t
,
B˜sEsγs√
t
)∣∣∣∣∣ , |γs| ≤ √t
]
+ E
[∣∣∣∣∣R
(
Ws√
t
,
B˜sEsγs√
t
)∣∣∣∣∣ , |γs| > √t
]
≤ 1
6t3/2
‖D3φ‖E[|BsEsγs|3, |γs| ≤ 
√
t] +
1
t
‖D2φ‖E[|BsEsγs|2, |γs| > 
√
t]
≤ K
6t
‖D3φ‖E[|γ1|2] + K
t
‖D2φ‖E[|γ1|2, |γ1| > 
√
t].
For the first expectation we used the estimation of R from (9.18) with the second estimate,
while for the second we use the first estimate in (9.18). The next round of inequalities
involves the fact that B˜s converges, thus the operator norm is bounded. Similarly Et is
bounded and K is a common bound for all |B˜sEs|.
A similar inequality is obtained for the other case, namely with Zs instead of γ. Thus we
get that each term in the summation of (9.17) is bounded by
K
6t
‖D3φ‖(E[|γ1|2] + E[|Z1|2]) + K
t
‖D2φ‖(E[|γ1|2, |γ1| > 
√
t] + E[|Z1|2, |Z1| > 
√
t])
This means that we can bound now for every  > 0,
|E
[
φ
(
Xt√
t
)]
− E
[
φ
(
Yt√
t
)]
| ≤ K
6
‖D3φ‖(E[|γ1|2] + E[|Z1|2])
+K‖D2φ‖(E[|γ1|2, |γ1| > 
√
t] + E[|Z1|2, |Z1| > 
√
t])
Letting now t→∞ and then → 0, finishes the argument, showing that we can replace
the γ by normal random variables with the same mean and variance for which the CLT is
clear.

9.3. Simulation result for CLT. In the averaging case, when the noise is Gaussian so is the asymp-
totic distribution. However, we illustrate the less obvious CLT result (figure 3), namely even when
the noise terms are iid for any general distribution. Again the simulations are for two agents with
fixed A and E matrices and (γts) is a vector with +1 or −1. The joint plot are heavily concentrated
on a straight line indicating that agents are synchronized.
10. CONCLUSION
To isolate learning, we dispensed with traditional game theoretic notions of utility. There has
been a growing trend across disciplines to study this aspect. The abundance of data from the on-
line world on interactions means social network models are gaining the interests of theoreticians
as well as experimentalists. Our work is the first to our knowledge that generalizes Degroot learn-
ing to incorporate randomness and develop distribution results on the beliefs themselves. What
kind of distributions arise, when there is no consensus? This question was examined at length. It
is not necessary that a Gaussian distribution arises. It depends on the underlying randomness.
For previous studies in social learning, the noise is interpreted as a private signal. In our setting,
one can think of the noise in this way. However, the emphasis we put was on the probabilistic
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FIGURE 3. Here Xt converges to a Normal random variable. The joint plot illus-
trates the case for two agents who learn from each other with A and E fixed. Large
t = 2000 and 3000 samples were created.
notions of consensus. Agreement can be to a point, a probability measure or to a line. This holds
regardless of the number of agents.
When the noise is not decaying, condition (7.4) is crucial to ensure convergence in distribution.
This condition can be thought of as a stabilization feature of learning. Individuals learn with
varying At and Et but these cannot change too drastically. Eventually, all agents settle down. We
extended the standard Degroot learning models to incorporate a variety of noise terms.
One criticism of having σ¯ is that it is already incorporated into the learning. To relax this as-
sumption, we introduced averaging dynamics where the ground truth is endogenous [Son16]
to the social network. The central limit theorem developed in Theorem 16 has an unusual fea-
ture. The marginal distributions are Gaussian but the joint distribution encapsulates the consensus
property as agents synchronize along a line. An interesting aspect of our results is that we place
no restrictions on the interaction matrix A, the implicit network topology, being fully connected
all the time. Social connections can change with time. The only requirement was that agents have
self-belief. However, there can be periods of insanity where learning rates i’s are also zero or the
interaction matrix is just the identity matrix. Individual players can be insane and refuse fo learn
for short bouts. Mixing of beliefs and convergence to consensus is ensured by conditions (9.7) or
(7.2). These assumptions are weaker than previous attempts, which require strong connectivity
between the agents.
Thus far, agents’ rules are mechanical. Future work should address the issue of rationality.
In Degroot learning, individuals are boundedly rational. They use the same rule. What if the
agents are strategic? In the presence of noise or disturbance, manipulation of opinion dynamics
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by forceful agents [AOP10] becomes an interesting but difficult question. A possible way forward
is to look at fully nonlinear models. Random dynamical systems were reviewed by [BM03]. Our
results use different techniques to study social learning. Though it must be acknowledged that
recursive random dynamical systems are not new in economics, their probabilistic analysis poses
several challenges to researchers. The interaction between mathematical finance and game theory
groups should take into account the resurgence of social learning models. How a distribution
of beliefs on prices for financial assets arises is not only a fundamental question for game theo-
rists but also of interest to proponents of stochastic volatility and asset pricing models. Rather
than viewing trading as an exogenous activity, it should be seen as an essential combination of
interaction and learning.
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